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This is an empirical investigation. At the beginning of 2014, for the first time, the 
European Union co-chaired meetings with Myanmar, which it hosted in Brussels 
within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) of which Myanmar has been part since 
2004. ARF is the ‘only multilateral political and security dialogue forum in the Asia-
Pacific where the EU has its own seat’ (EEAS). For this reason and because the 
European Union is not a major actor in the region in terms of security affairs 
(Stumbaun 2014, 111), the EU holds a specific interest in ARF. At the meetings in 
Brussels, it was planned to discuss ‘various aspects of security cooperation in Asia’, 
including ‘humanitarian assistance and disaster relief’ (EIAS 2014). These, and other 
events, suggested that a Myanmar-EU security connection exists and motivated the 
interest in tracing the EU’s efforts, in the ARF arena, to encouraging Myanmar to tie 
in with the security link. This paper, therefore, focuses on two research questions: how 
has the European Union interacted with Myanmar via ASEAN, at the Forum, trying 
(directly or indirectly) to induce Myanmar’s junta towards connecting with 
cooperation in the area of security, as opposed to its preferred ‘non-interference 
policy’? Since the dialogue and many of the training activities in the ARF framework 
concerned crisis management and disaster relief capacity building, Cyclone Nargis, 
which hit Myanmar in 2008, is taken as a test case to explore whether Myanmar and 
ASEAN’s reactions to the devastation caused certain processes to emerge which can 
be linked to the EU. The second question is: as the EU sought to convince Myanmar to 
compromise and accept cooperation, has Myanmar hit by Cyclone Nargis caused 
some consequences on the EU and its security policy, and, if so, how? Interpretations 
borrowed from March and Olsen (1995, 1998, 2004) and Checkel (1999, 2005) will 
contribute towards answering the two key questions. The EU’s quest to encourage 
security cooperation is investigated in light of the ARF meetings that it co-chaired 
with ASEAN during 2004-2008. The first date is justified by Myanmar being admitted 
to ARF and the second by Cyclone Nargis afflicting Myanmar. Lacking access to the 
informal minutes of these meetings, interviews on motivation will serve to compensate 
for the limited sources which are the ARF co-chairs’ summary reports. Official 
declarations by the Commission, the Council and the EU together with ASEAN will 
indicate the EU’s ‘intentional policies’ at the Forum level. The investigation includes 
no specific focus on the Forum itself in terms of assessing its operation, on the 
domestic level of analysis, on the decision-making processes, nor on the participants 
in the ASEAN Regional Forum who were different from the ASEAN group, Myanmar 
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and the EU. It offers no hint at other frameworks of security consultation in Asia in 
which the EU might be involved, and pays no attention either to whether Myanmar 
was somehow connected with cooperation in the area of security, or to the EU’s 
efforts to encourage Myanmar to compromise, both up to the current position.  
 
Key words: EU, security cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN, 
Burma/Myanmar, foreign policy analysis    
 
I Introduction  
 
At the beginning of 2014, for the first time, the European Union co-chaired meetings with 
Myanmar, which it hosted in Brussels within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) of 
which Myanmar has been part since 2004, and the EU since 1994, when ARF has been 
established. The ASEAN Regional Forum is the platform which brings together nations 
across the Asia-Pacific region: the ten ASEAN countries and Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States, plus the EU. The 
meetings in Brussels concerned Defence Officials’ Dialogue (DOD) and Inter-sessional 
Support Group (ISG) on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Preventive 
Diplomacy (PD). Various aspects related to security cooperation in Asia were planned to 
be discussed. These included ‘counter-terrorism’, ‘organized crime’, ‘cyber security and 
non-proliferation’, and, in particular, “humanitarian assistance and disaster relief” (EIAS 
2014). The whole proved that Myanmar was cooperating with the EU in the field of 
security. Relatively recently (5 March 2013), Myanmar has stipulated an agreement with 
the EU, the ‘EU-Myanmar Partnership’. In this document the EU pledged to work with 
Myanmar on specific issues concerning ‘preparedness, response and resilience to 
emergencies’, and intended to pursue this goal through ‘building up a professional and 
effective response system’ (p. 2). Also this agreement indicates that a Myanmar-EU 
security connection exists. In mid-2014, Myanmar’s government accepted, by the EU, the 
funding of the Myanmar National Crisis Management Centre, which has been established 
in Nay Pyi Taw, the new capital. This EU’s action is indicative of its support for capacity 
development concerning crisis-related responses (Reiterer 2014). These commitments 
and agreements between Myanmar’s government and the European Union, specifically 
its external branch, the European External Action Service (EEAS), testify to a shift in 
Yangon/Nay Pyi Taw’s government towards (cautiously) detaching itself from the rigid 
non-interference dogma that has characterised its policy for decades. Myanmar’s junta 
has opposed any multilateral option in general, and, even more so, with regard to 
approaching aspects of security (EIAS 2014). These events, suggesting that a Myanmar-
EU security link subsists, motivate the interest in tracing the EU’s efforts, in the ARF 
arena, to encourage Myanmar’s politico-military establishment to tie in with the security 
connection. As a convinced proponent of a multilateral approach to security and defence 
problem solving and supporter of a collective security through dialogue and cooperation 
with international partners and organisations (ESS, 2003; COM 1994, 5), the European 
Union antagonised Myanmar’s junta’s chosen isolation, and specifically in the area of 
security and defence. The EU’s experience as ‘a collective and in Asia not yet well 
known political and security actor’ (Reiterer 2014, 20) inspired the EU’s policy proposed 
at the ARF meetings. This investigation develops around two research questions: how has 
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the European Union interacted with Myanmar via ASEAN, at the Forum, trying (directly 
or indirectly) to induce Myanmar’s junta towards connecting with cooperation in the 
area of security, as opposed to its preferred ‘non-interference policy’? Since the dialogue 
and many of the training activities in the ARF framework concerned crisis management 
and disaster relief capacity building, Cyclone Nargis, which hit Myanmar in 2008, is 
taken as a test case to explore whether Myanmar and ASEAN’s reactions to the 
devastation caused certain processes to emerge which can be linked to the EU. The 
second question is: as the EU sought to convince Myanmar to compromise and accept 
cooperation, has Myanmar hit by Cyclone Nargis caused some consequences on the EU 
and its security policy, and, if so, how? Interpretations borrowed from March and Olsen 
(1995, 1998, 2004) and Checkel (1999, 2005) will contribute towards answering the two 
key questions. The EU’s quest to encourage security cooperation is investigated via the 
ARF meetings that it co-chaired with ASEAN during 2004-2008, and specifically 
through the co-chair’s summary reports. Not being an ASEAN member, with ASEAN, 
the EU was allowed to co-chair the meetings. It made use of this opportunity in 2004-5 
and 2006/7 and co-chaired the ARF Inter-sessional Group on Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) and Preventive Diplomacy (PD) (Weber 2013, 351; Thayer 2009, 78). 
Lacking access to the informal minutes of the meetings, interviews on motivation will 
serve to fill this gap of our limited sources. Official declarations by the Commission, the 
Council and the EU together with ASEAN will indicate the EU’s ‘intentional policies’ at 
the Forum level. The investigation includes no specific focus on the Forum itself in terms 
of assessing its operation, on the domestic level of analysis, on the decision-making 
processes, or on the participants in the ASEAN Regional Forum different from the 
ASEAN group, Myanmar and the EU. It offers no hint at other frameworks of security 
consultation in Asia with which the EU might be involved, and pays no attention to 
whether Myanmar was somehow connected with cooperation in the area of security, nor 
to the EU’s efforts to encourage Myanmar to compromise, both up to the current position.  
 
The investigation is divided into five sections following this introduction, and 
culminates in a conclusion. Section two deals with the framework of analysis, and section 
three centres on the recent mainsteam literature concerned with the EU’s networking with 
ARF, ASEAN and Myanmar – with a focus on the EU’s encouragement of security 
cooperation, and conveys the way in which the present work relates to others’ 
publications. Section four deals with the EU at the Forum and is divided into three 
subsections. It first reviews the EU’s interest in ARF and how the latter is organised. It 
then looks at the engagements that the EU stated to be willing to undertake at the Forum 
through an insight into the official documents of the Commission. It also offers the view 
of the EU as co-chair of the ARF meetings (in 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008), i.e. some of 
its positions which may generate processes to be linked to Myanmar or ASEAN. Section 
five deals with the reactions of ASEAN, ARF, Myanmar and the EU to Cyclone Nargis’ 
ravaging of Myanmar. Section six, ‘what the framework of analysis reveals about the EU 
encouraging, at ARF, cooperation on security’, is mostly analytical. It is divided into four 
subsections and discusses: the processes which evolved in the context of the EU co-
chaired meetings; the dynamics of socialisation shedding some explicatory light on 
ASEAN’s behaviour in response to the cyclone; the logic of consequences trying to give 
reasons concerning Nay Pyi Taw’s behaviour, and also the social mechanisms and 
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argument of the ‘agent-carriers of new ideas’; and, lastly, the logic of appropriateness’ 
explanation of the EU’s behaviour. This section’s analysis avails itself of interviews with 
ASEAN leaders and leaders close to the ARF organisation, Southeast Asian security 
policy analysts, Burmese historians, together with personnel from Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination, the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, and more in 
general from the EU’s external branch, the EEAS.  
 
II The framework of analysis  
 
How the EU’s encouragement, at the Forum, concerning security cooperation interacted 
with Myanmar via ASEAN and, how the EU itself was exposed to side effects which had 
their origins in Myanmar will be considered through interpretations offered by March and 
Olsen (1995, 1998, 2004) and Checkel (1999, 2005). Concerning March and Olsen, I start 
by recalling, that since external security tensions principally arise in a multilateral 
context, one of the main tasks of the states participating in the ARF meetings is agreeing 
together how to face security strains (ARF’s Concept Paper 1995, (ARF-CP (1995)). 
There has been a specific emphasis on the scope of the Forum of ‘reconcil[ing] the 
differing views between ARF participants’ under the conviction that unifying visions 
would ‘reduce the risk to security’ (ibid.). There has been a reported tendency of ARF to 
move beyond dialogue towards practical security cooperation (Haacke 2009), which 
would suggest that common agreement may tend to bridge mere diplomatic declarations 
with more proactive policies. National considerations, however, trump conceptions of 
any common, stable ARF interest (Acharya 2014; Simon, S. 1995). ASEAN members 
have been determined to retain their national prerogatives (Ruland 2010), even while 
strengthening their commitment to homogenising their policy in view of the increasing 
regionalism through Bali Concord II (2003), Vientiane Action Programme (2004) and the 
ASEAN Charter (2007) (deFlers 2010). ASEAN members have declared their interest in 
common action, largely on the basis that influence and effectiveness in foreign policy is, 
to a considerable extent, based on speaking and working together (ARF’s Concept Paper 
1995). March and Olsen (1998) foresee ‘agreeing together’ via a logic of expected 
consequences. They posit that the strategic calculation of rational bargaining suggests a 
logic of expected consequences when a government’s protection and defence of what it 
perceives as its national interest confronts but frequently becomes reconciled with the 
position of other states on the same policy issue. A logic of expected consequences 
‘explains’ policy positions by offering an interpretation of the outcomes expected from 
such positions (p. 950). It sees political order as deriving from negotiations among 
rational actors following personal interests, in situations where there may be advantages 
attached to coordinated action (p. 949). It perceives politics as aggregating individual 
preferences into collective action through various processes of bargaining, coalition 
building and exchange (see: Niskanen 1971). On the other hand, when governments tend 
to recognise the ethical dimensions and collective norms of the group, March and Olsen 
identify a logic of appropriateness that motivates the behaviour (p. 951). Embedded in a 
collectivity (such as ASEAN), states-actors do what they see as appropriate for 
themselves in a specific type of situation (March and Olsen 2004, 3). To act appropriately 
is to proceed according to practices based on a collective, mutual and tacit understanding 
(p. 4). The logic of appropriateness embraces principled dimensions and aspirations (see 
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March and Olsen 1995, 1998, 2004), and ‘explains’ foreign policy as the application of 
rules, associated with specific identities, to specific circumstances (March and Olsen 
1998, 951). A common interpretation of rules is that they exist because they work well 
and provide better solutions than their alternatives (see: Hechter, Opp and Wippler 1990) 
(March and Olsen 2004, 12). However, it is also true that the logic of appropriateness 
does not guarantee moral acceptability (p. 4). Yet, the division between the two logics is 
faint. States and their political actors are characterised both by their interests and by the 
rules ingrained in their identities, as well as in the political institutions that they decided 
to build, loose and unfastening as they might be. ‘Appropriateness need not attend to 
consequences’ (March and Olsen 1998, 951), in the sense that it does not include a focus 
on consequences. As March and Olsen specify, ‘the descriptive question is whether (or 
when) one logic is more likely than the other to be observed as the basis for actual 
behaviour’ (p. 949).  
 
Concerning Checkel’s contribution (1999), the dynamics of socialisation and social 
learning will help to capture aspects of the interaction between the EU, ASEAN and 
Myanmar. Socialisation is a process which most likely develops when the contact among 
actors become frequent due to their working together, having common tasks to perform, 
or decisions to take in a group, all kind of practices which need several exchanges in 
order to accomplish. Social learning implies a cessation of strict practices of 
methodological individualism. It involves a process whereby actors, through contact with 
other contexts (discursive structures and/or norms), develop new interests and 
preferences. In an abstract sense, it can readily be appreciated that social learning takes 
place at certain times and that there are times when agents acquire new preferences (pp. 
548-9). As for Checkel, ‘social learning is more likely…where a group meets repeatedly 
and there is a high density of interaction among participants…where the group feels itself 
in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure’. A setting 
where agents should be conducive to persuasion, Checkel argues, is most likely ‘when 
the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs 
or wants to belong’. Persuasion is a mechanism through which social learning may occur 
and may lead to interest redefinition and identity change (pp. 549-550). There were many 
channels within the ARF framework where ASEAN, Myanmar and the EU through their 
own representatives networked together within contexts, which were potentially 
conducive to socialisation. Between 2004 and 2008, several meetings took place in the 
ARF structure. Strictly concerning aspects of security or closely related to it, they were: 
No. 10 meetings of the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures 
(ISG on CBMs); No. 4 seminars related to Peacekeeping; No. 8 of the type of Search, 
Rescue and Disaster Relief; No. 32 related to Defence. These were ARF Defence 
Officials’ Meetings, and ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue, ARF Heads of Defence 
Universities/Colleges/Institutions Meetings, ARF Security Policy Conference, 
Workshops on Civil Military Relations and the Rule of Law, and Workshops on Changes 
in the Security Perception and Military Doctrine of ARF members. There were no. 10 
Counter-Terrorism Related meetings; no. 4 concerning Non Traditional Security Issues; 
no. 9 aimed at Maritime Security; no. 2 regarding Preventive Diplomacy; no. 5 dedicated 
to Non-Proliferation; no. 3 targeted at the management of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons; no. 2 related to Energy Security; and no. 2 linked to Experts/Eminent Persons 
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(EEPs) Meetings (ARF Activities). These ARF activities have taken place also in 
Yangon, such as the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue and the ISG on CBMs. When 
events were situated outside Myanmar, officials from Yangon’s administration 
represented their government at the meetings. There were several occasions for the 
officials to integrate their views. Checkel’s interpretation about the optimum scope 
conditions under which socialisation was likely to occur was when individuals were in 
settings where the contact was long, and sustained, as well as intense (Howorth 2010, 
15).  
 
III Recent publications  
 
With regard to investigations on the EU’s efforts to encourage security cooperation while 
at the Forum, trying to connect with Myanmar and ASEAN – no similar works have been 
found among the publications. Political scientists and observers have growingly paid 
attention to Myanmar, also with regard to security cooperation in Southeast Asia. The 
most complete publication on the European Union and ARF is Weber’s work (2013), 
which proposed some reflections on the EU’s role in promoting security in the Asia-
Pacific region via the ASEAN Regional Forum; yet she makes only a cursory mention of 
Myanmar. Haacke (2013) published an overview of Southeast Asian international 
relations and security perspectives, with insights into Myanmar’s reactions to security 
incidents; however his study almost completely ignored the EU. Emmers and Tan (2011) 
argued that ARF has evolved into a highly inflexible forum, and this fact has severely 
inhibited the adoption of a ‘preventive diplomacy’ agenda under the ARF framework. 
Neither the EU nor Myanmar was included in their discussion. Haacke and Morada 
(2010) made available a view of the ARF in terms of cooperative security, including 
traits of policy originating in Myanmar. Yet, their contribution paid no attention to the 
European Union. By contrast, Reiterer (2014) has very recently published an informed 
and updated evaluation of the European Union’s comprehensive approach to security in 
Asia. Nonetheless, his study has offered a very modest outlook of Myanmar. Casarini 
(2011) has drawn an outline of the security developments in East Asia and consequences 
for the EU, but he made no mention of Myanmar. Interestingly, Haacke (2009) has 
offered an interpretation of the way in which the ARF has moved beyond dialogue 
towards practical security cooperation, though, this time, he left Myanmar out of focus, 
and, similarly, the EU. Katsumata (2006) emphasised the efforts of ASEAN, in ARF, to 
achieve the security of the whole region, through multilateral security cooperation, along 
the view that regional security is indivisible, though this contribution emphasises neither 
Myanmar nor the EU. Heller (2005) has argued that the ARF is a forum that reflects the 
convergence of the strategic interests of both the regional and external actors. However, 
he pays no attention to the European Union and virtually ignores Myanmar. Berkofsky 
(2003) has discussed some ideas regarding the function that the EU should cover, and 
develop, within ARF to enhance security in Asia. Yet, his policy brief gives a very brief 
hint about Burma. Hence, an investigation tying in the EU, Myanmar, and ASEAN, at the 
ARF level, from the perspective of the EU’s trying to inspire security cooperation 
appears to be unavailable; thus, the present study aims to fill this gap. 
 
IV The EU and the Forum  
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How was the EU represented at the Forum? The High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission 
embodied the European Union at the ASEAN Regional Forum, and participated on behalf 
of the member states. As the EU likes to assert (EU&Asia), ‘the European Union [has] 
participated actively in the ASEAN Regional Forum’, since its establishment. It 
participated in ARF on account of ‘its commitment [to it] as part of the European Union’s 
overall engagement with a security order in Asia’ (EEAS-ARF). It has participated to 
ensure political and strategic exchanges with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. It 
aimed to foster conflict prevention, under the conviction that ‘any major security incident 
in Asia would have serious implications for Europe’. Together with stressing its reasons 
for participation, the European Union has never concealed its aspiration (or objective, as 
it put it) to establish itself as a ‘political and security player’ in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The scope of the consultation on ‘regional political and security issues’ was the choice of 
‘reconcil[ing] the differing views between the ARF participants’. This meant that 
lessening the diversity of views would have ‘reduce[d] the risk to security’, precisely as 
the European Union understood these relations. As part of ARF’s working method, 
several groups and sub-groups, either for consultations or training purposes and practices, 
were arranged (ARF Concept Paper, 1995). The fixed convening of the groups was at the 
inter-governmental level, and the meetings reflected the three stages of development of 
the ARF’s activities: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and approach 
elaboration to conflicts (ARF 1995). The Concept Paper defined the goals and 
expectations of the Forum, its organisation, and the kind of participation. It suggested 
how ARF could serve to implement ‘ideals and proposals’, and specified that ‘decisions 
were made on the basis of consensus and compliance. The meetings were, among others, 
the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy (in 
particular a dialogue on security perceptions and defence policy papers) and the Inter-
sessional Meetings on Cooperative Activities, including, inter alia, disaster relief and 
Peacekeeping (ARF-CP 1995).
1
 Confidence building measures were actions meant to 
address, prevent and resolve uncertainties among actors and states, and could involve 
(direct or indirect) negotiations (CBMs). Disaster relief measures were intended to 
ensure a coordinated response in order to increase the local resilience of the people 
offended by natural, or man-made, disasters (DRMs). Since ARF’s inception, it was 
convened that ASEAN was the ‘primary driving force’ and chaired the annual meeting 
(Weber 2013, 351). Acknowledging the importance of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
European External Action Service, in its attribute of the external arm of the EU, and the 
EU member states have taken part in several ARF work strands (Reiterer 2014, 17), and 
cooperated with ASEAN in drawing and adopting ARF statements.  
 
Observers argue that the ASEAN Regional Forum has proved incapable of addressing 
hard security issues, and cite the case of the denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula and 
non-proliferation. Similarly, they judge that neither did the preventive diplomacy reach 
the desired standard, and mention the conflict in Kashmir and the Taiwan Straits. More 
positive evaluations cover ARF’s dealing with soft security matters, where the Forum has 
been more effective. Analysts uphold that ARF may have a ‘lease of life’ following the 
2004 Tsunami (which hit the Indian Ocean area, particularly Indonesia) and Cyclone 
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Nargis that struck Myanmar in 2008 (Thayer 2009, 79). Others, judging that ARF has 
advanced from dialogue towards factual security cooperation, contend that ARF is 
developing capacity building and operational security responses, also, outside the Forum, 
and argue that this outcome is the result of initiatives supported by a small group of 
ASEAN and some non-ASEAN states (Haacke 2009). Because ARF was formed, also, to 
step up its practical involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, ARF 
Disaster Relief Exercises have taken place, including recently, in Thailand (May 2013) 
(DRE). The joint participation of the European External Action Service, the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and several EU member states (Belgium, 
Austria and Luxembourg) in the exercise in Thailand showed that the EU ‘attached 
particular importance to improving the early warning and disaster management 
capabilities in the region’ (Reiterer 2014, 17-18).  
 
The EU’s intentions at ARF: the official documents   
 
The EU’s position, in the ARF framework, that could be linked to convincing Myanmar’s 
junta to connect with security cooperation was expressed within the joint declarations 
with ASEAN. ASEAN was a moderator of any possible EU overtone reproaching 
Myanmar and demanding transformations. EU’s policy on Myanmar developed through 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctioning the military junta since 
1991, and through the EU-ASEAN dialogue (see: Marchi 2014). What can be deduced 
from the ARF meetings’ declarations co-chaired by the EU has little direct relation to 
Myanmar. Nonetheless, connections can be made concerning ASEAN and Myanmar in 
terms of EU support of multilateral security options. An outline of the engagement that 
the EU stated to be willing to undertake is enclosed in the European Commission’s 
official documents.  
 
From the 1994 Commission’s communication, ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’ (COM 
1994), and from the viewpoint of the European Union acting with a focus on security and 
stability in Southeast Asia, the EU’s relations with ARF became imbued with the idea 
that enhanced security cooperation was likely to benefit both regions. The EU was led by 
a declared dual objective in its interactions with ARF. It sought to support ‘the efforts of 
Asian countries to cooperate’ in that forum, as the Commission stated in 1994 (p. 4). At 
the same time, it aspired to ‘strengthen the position and profile of the EU in Asia’, as the 
2001 Commission’s communication made it clear (COM 2001, 26). The latter document 
also specified that, within ARF, the EU maintained ‘distinguished relations’ with 
ASEAN; and this is why the two groups’ interactions will be a constant feature of this 
work. Furthermore, the 2001 communication explained that the EU interpreted the 
dialogue with ASEAN as one which was going to ‘help to identify areas where ASEAN 
and the EU could work together’ on security challenges. It, then, made it more 
understandable that, giving ‘full support to conflict prevention efforts within the region’ 
was on the agenda of the cooperation which the EU sought to offer (p. 21). Conflict 
prevention included that range of actions intended to anticipate and deter the outburst of 
conflict (EPLO). That same Commission’s document, of 2001, also specified that the 
promotion of good governance, transparency and the rule of law highlighted what the EU 
defined as its ‘increasingly active role in the ASEAN Regional Forum’ (p. 21).  
 9 
 
A further communication from the Commission, in 2003, has indicated that the 
ambition of the EU to develop ‘a more active role in the ARF’ was entrenched in its 
determination to be influential when it co-chaired meetings. This specification was 
highlighted in ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’ (COM 2003, 13). The European 
Union also included its ambition to revitalise ‘its presence at the military tables of the 
ARF’ (p. 13). The Council has specified, in 2007, that the EU saw the employment of the 
multilateral framework as the basis for ‘building a better world’, and indicated this in the 
‘Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership’. The EU’s vision was 
underpinned by the EU-ASEAN’s ‘common understanding of security as a 
comprehensive concept with a political, human, social and economic dimension’ 
(Nuremberg 2007, 3). Furthermore, in a following document, in 2007, the EU has 
declared that ‘crisis management’ and ‘capacity building’ were expected to enrich the 
EU’s security dialogue with ASEAN in the form of ‘knowledge transfer’ and ‘exchange 
of best practices’ (Plan of Action 2007, 2). Capacity building involved actions focused on 
the development of skills and attitudes in groups and individuals with regard to the 
formation, management and maintenance of processes which were locally meaningful 
(Howorth 2007). Crisis management, in its civilian aspects, extended its operation to the 
wider area of the rule of law (strengthening the police sector), and included monitoring 
borders and peace agreements (C-CM). The whole of these EU’s propositions were 
acknowledged in the ‘Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-
ASEAN Enhanced Partnership’ of 2007. There within, in addition, the EU extended its 
political action to the Association to the point of encouraging the ‘participation of 
ASEAN countries in European Security and Defence Policy operations’, in full respect of 
the mandate of both regional organisations.
2
 Hence, the EU claimed that disaster 
management and coordination on disasters, risk reduction, emergency response and 
information sharing were within the focus of the cooperation with ASEAN envisioned by 
the EU (Plan of Action 2007, 3). These EU’s plans, purposes and commitments were 
meant to contribute to the debate at the Forum where Myanmar participated as a full actor 
in its capacity of a full member of ASEAN since 1997 and a recognised participant in 
ARF seven years later.  
 
The EU as co-chair of ARF meetings  
 
Potsdam: 2005   
In Potsdam, in 2005, at the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Support Group on 
Confidence Building Measures, co-chaired by the EU (21-23 February), representatives 
of Myanmar’s junta sought to convince the ARF participants, including the European 
Union representatives, that the course of Burmese reform was on track, namely the 
implementation of the Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy (CSR 2005). The Roadmap 
was expected to address also security matters, and was seen to offer an opportunity to 
implement ‘ceasefire strategies’ in Myanmar (Jones 2014, 16). The observance of the 
Seven Steps programme was a matter of interest and preoccupation for ASEAN, firstly, 
because of their true support for a transition in Myanmar and, secondly, because it was 
expected to soothe the international agitation originated by the military junta, which also 
affected the Association itself (Caballero-Antony 2010, 26-7). ASEAN’s relations with 
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the EU had already suffered when Myanmar was annexed to ASEAN and, later, when it 
was accepted in ARF (Marchi 2014, 63, 67-8). ASEAN’s ‘completion of the vision of the 
ASEAN founders’ and project of successful regionalism had called for these inclusions 
(Acharya 2002). Hence, in Potsdam, possibly, to break down the wall that separated the 
processes under way in ASEAN as a whole (the integration efforts of ASEAN’s 
regionalism) and Myanmar (the vocal intention to comply with the Seven Steps reforms), 
the EU delegates put the accent on what they conceivably thought to be the success of the 
multilateral participation (that the EU privileged and supported) in approaching security 
situations. The EU officials focused on threats to non-traditional security, particularly 
crisis prevention, dispute avoidance, management and settlement. They indicated that a 
combined process of multilateral inputs and arrangements, rather than a single country’s 
efforts, more easily antagonised complex situations. Governments acting unilaterally 
were putting themselves at a disadvantage. To that scope, the officials explained the 
concept of the (at that time) European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was 
described as that process which aimed at strengthening the EU’s ‘external ability to act 
through the development of civilian and military capabilities in conflict prevention and 
crisis management’. They claimed that the coordination of civilian and military 
capabilities was central to successful operations. The EU’s action in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EU-ALTHEA), as well as its contribution towards supporting the local 
authorities to build and safeguard a secure environment served to exemplify the specific 
value wanted by the EU, which was the centrality of the role of the local authorities in the 
progress of the security goal. Hence, at the Potsdam meeting, the idea of the role played 
by the EU in terms of preventing and easing crises emerged as an illustration of the action 
that ASEAN and its members, Myanmar included, and ARF participants could provide to 
the region when such support seemed necessary to the group (CSR 2005).  
 
Helsinki: 2007, and before, Phnom Penh: 2004, and Berlin: 2008  
In Helsinki, in 2007, at the other ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence 
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy co-chaired by the European Union (28-30 
March), the EU sought to promote confidence building practices through discussing the 
Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) ‘potential for 
strengthening ties with the ARF’ (CSR 2007). Already at a previous meeting that it co-
chaired (Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures), in 2004 (26-
28 October) in Phnom Penh, the EU had succeeded in promoting the inclusion of the 
‘need to maintain informal contacts’ with OSCE in ARF’s conclusive official position 
(CSR 2004). Its message, at that time, had focused on showing that the two groups’ 
constructive and productive interaction was confirmed by the extent to which many of the 
issues with which the EU increasingly became involved were common to those 
motivating OSCE’s missions.3 The EU’s experience shared good governance, democratic 
transition, human rights and minority rights with OSCE. Hence, in Helsinki, the EU’s 
multilateral influence featured, more intensely, through explaining (to the ASEAN 
nations, Myanmar and the other ARF partners) OSCE’s expansion, progress, structure 
and activities (CSR 2007). It pursued this endeavour also at the successive co-chaired 
event in Berlin (2008), the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and 
Preventive Diplomacy in Asia and Europe (12-14 March). There, ‘transparency’ and 
‘information’ were examined, classified as substantial key factors in OSCE/EU activity, 
 11 
and used as examples of the practices that could develop and characterise security 
behaviour among the countries of Southeast Asia and the other ARF participants (CSR 
2008). Representatives of the EU stressed that the obligation to share military 
information, data on major weapons and equipment systems, defence planning and 
expenditure were fundamental to a policy associated with an ‘open’ dialogue on security 
(CHS). They defended the adoption of a common security concept together with the 
development of politically binding standards and the gradual institutionalisation of 
cooperation as processes offering a solid and durable basis for security collaboration 
(CSR 2008). Were all of these discourses, supported by the EU at the Forum, going to 
create some consequences among the regional actors, ASEAN and Myanmar?   
 
V Cyclone Nargis  
 
Around that same time, in May 2008, Cyclone Nargis ravaged Myanmar’s Irrawaddy 
Delta causing huge destruction and loss of life. It produced reactions among the local 
actors. Initially, with regard to Myanmar, the government was overwhelmed by the 
magnitude and complexity of the disaster relief problems. The junta’s attitude, 
particularly at the beginning of the crisis, in refusing external help did little to diminish 
the difficulties. The EU, and other external agents, was barred from being an actor by the 
SPDC’s inflexible non-interference policy (see: Selth 2008; Haacke 2008).  Concerning 
ARF, the latter has not entered into action. It was reported that ‘it may have been that 
ARF Senior Officials were among the first to meet soon afterwards Nargis had struck’ 
(Haacke and Morada 2010, 228), but it was ASEAN that was the predominant actor in 
the contingent cyclone’s circumstance.4 Myanmar, distressed by the cyclone, induced 
some processes which concerned the EU too and its security policy.  
 
ASEAN  
The Association’s activity was vital to the extent that it networked the government in 
Myanmar and other international actors, which were ready to assist. It made possible the 
constitution of the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, led by the ASEAN Secretary 
General, that operated through the Tripartite Core Group (TCG: the Government of 
Myanmar, ASEAN and the UN), coordinated the relief work and delivered assistance. 
The Task Force was the first ASEAN-led mechanism that involved ASEAN member 
states individually and collectively (in addition to the international community and the 
UN), and, as such, its value was embedded in having built a regional response to a local 
problem (ARF 2008). ASEAN bridged Myanmar’s government to the donor nations and 
their funding. It allowed, for example, through the TCG, the financing and development 
of the Commission’s Post-Cyclone Nargis recovery and preparedness Plan over three 




At their meeting, shortly after the cyclone struck, the 15
th
 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF 
2008, 24 July), ARF ministers discussed several failures of the Humanitarian Task Force 
which obscured its reassuring results. The ministers took several decisions. They decided 
that the Forum should ‘intensify cooperation’ specifically in some areas which included 
‘emergency preparedness, disaster relief and management, rehabilitation and recovery’. 
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They opted for additional preparation concerning ‘technical assistance and coordination 
among ARF participants in advance of disasters’. ARF officials realised that, for 
calamities of this scale, a ‘civil and military intervention’ was more beneficial to the 
scope of reinforcing aid to specific areas. They concluded that the coordination of the 
civil and military capabilities was key to a multinational response. The whole of these 
endorsements were detailed in the Chair’s statement of that ARF meeting, that was 
notably not co-chaired by the EU, in Singapore (ARF 2008).  
 
Myanmar  
What resulted from the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force’s intervention in Myanmar, 
with regard to the military government’s approach to policy-making, was a softened non-
interference stance by the junta (see Cook 2013, 184). Myanmar’s change was tangible. It 
was also confirmed by Brussels, where Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner acknowledged 
the opening up of an ‘unprecedented dialogue’ with Myanmar’s government (which the 
Commissioner defined as having been paved by the coordinating efforts of ASEAN and 
the UN) (EC 2009).  
 
The EU  
Myanmar’s devastation caused by Nargis provided the European Union with some new 
thinking (EUC 2008). The European Council, around that same time, in November 2008, 
discussed the state of affairs of the European Security and Defence Policy, and argued 
that, after five years of civilian missions, a ‘large body of information and experience 
[was] available which needed to be captured in a systematic lessons learned’ exercise 
(Council 2008, 16).
 
The exercise led to the recognition that the ‘function that [the EU] 
should play’ in Nargis-like situations required the use of a ‘broader understanding of the 
term responsibility to protect [R2P]’ (EUC 2008, 28).5 Human security was more far-
reaching an interpretation. More concretely, the new EU security policy (agreed in 
December 2008, i.e. the ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 
– Providing Security in a Changing World’) fixed the notion of a ‘shared responsibility to 
protect populations’ as the new goal included by law (IESS 2008, 12). The side effect of 
cyclone-affected Myanmar contributed towards building this.   
 
VI What the framework of analysis reveals about the EU encouraging, at 
ARF, cooperation on security 
 
(i) The official documents of the Commission 
 
(a) ASEAN  
As co-chair of the ARF meetings, the EU publicised the multilateral aspects of its policy 
in the field of security on the basis of its experience and aspiration to encourage others to 
follow. As an actor which wanted to mobilise the different strengths, values, and 
capacities of its partners (EP-C 2013) while operating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
the European Union sought to provide suggestions concerning security cooperation, 
confidence building and disaster relief. Yet, the EU and OSCE’s argument that the 
gradual institutionalisation of cooperation has underpinned their common action 
contrasted ARF’s distinctive loose character of collective security arena for dialogue 
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(Heller 2005; ARF-CP 2006). It antagonised the low institutionalised cooperation 
approach of the ASEAN group, though ASEAN was engaged in building a security 
community among its members, including Myanmar (Acharya 2001), and confronting the 
EU-OSCE’s interactions offered inputs to their security community project. Furthermore, 
the suggested commitment to an open security dialogue, made distinctive by 
‘transparency and sharing information’, was, as an official from the EEAS interviewed in 
Brussels confirmed, out of tune with the secrecy with which security and defence choices 
were made in the ASEAN group (Interview (A), 2014).  
 
(b) Myanmar 
Myanmar’s leadership, with the obligation that it has established in the 2008 constitution 
to preserve the nation’s sovereignty, and, more specifically, the sovereignty of its 
decision-making in the field of security, was conceivably indifferent to the messages 
addressed by the EU at the Forum. Myanmar’s leadership had to embrace a multiple 
process, with several preparations and arrangements, in order to cope with the declared 
commitment to implementing the Seven Steps Roadmap to Democracy. Incentives to 
change, promoted by the EU, in favour of Myanmar’s transformation were ready to be 
taken up at the Forum by the military junta. A full progression of actions was necessary 
to Myanmar’s promise to fulfil the Seven Steps programme: convening a National 
Convention to draft the constitution; taking steps to establish democracy after the 
National Convention was concluded; drafting a constitution based on the principles laid 
down by the National Convention; organising a national referendum to approve the 
redrafted constitution; holding free and fair elections for a Parliament; and building a 
modern and democratic nation through the support of the leaders elected by Parliament 
(Caballero-Antony 2010, 27). A boost to the junta’s expected connection with democracy 
was, for example, the idea of the incorporation of the fundamental freedoms, minority 
rights and democratic transition into ‘the indivisibility of the security concept’ (as it has 
been embraced by both the EU and OSCE). That progress was, however, irreconcilable 
with the thinking of Myanmar’s administration (Roberts 2010; Farrelly 2013). Similarly, 
there was no chance that Myanmar’s authorities would provide assistance to their 
ASEAN partners in the unfortunate case of a crisis occurring in the region and the need 
for help, or, as an interviewed official from the EEAS implied, accept ASEAN’s 
assistance, incoherently with the propositions from the EU (Interview (B), 2014).  
 
(ii) The dynamics of socialisation and ASEAN  
 
However, the reactions, among the local actors, to the devastation produced by Cyclone 
Nargis revealed fresh developments. ASEAN sorted out crisis support for Myanmar. 
How could this be the case? The dynamics of socialisation, as explained by Checkel 
(1999), and social learning might have been central to that development. Social learning 
takes place at certain times and there are times when agents acquire new preferences. As 
upheld in the framework of analysis’ section, social learning involves the development of 
processes whereby actors acquire new interests and preferences through contacts with 
other contexts, either discursive structures or norms. Three points try to explain how 
social learning (and the ability to persuade, and the crisis and policy failure argument) 
might have encouraged ASEAN’s engagement in crisis support for Myanmar.  
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First, there was no lack of transformative discourses at the ARF meetings through 
which to promote group learning and dispense norms, as agents of new interests (Checkel 
1999, 548). The Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures, the 
Peacekeeping groups, and those related to Search, Rescue and Disaster Relief, received 
growing support from the personnel from the EU External Service. These officials were 
from the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination section (Interview (B), 2014). 
Officials from the European Commission’s department providing emergency assistance 
and relief to the victims of natural disasters and armed conflict outside the European 
Union were also in contact with the ARF groups. Frequent exchanges with the 
Commission’s ECHO personnel for humanitarian assistance and long-term follow-up 
were confirmed  (Interview (C), 2014). Relations among these personnel and the groups’ 
participants indicate that communication most likely spread, and competence and 
knowledge were disseminated. We reported the number of times in which the working 
clusters, training and security exercises, and other groups met during the 2004-2008 
period. As the interviewed EEAS officials acknowledged, not only was it inevitable that 
interactions were going to develop new interests. It was the purpose of the frequency and 
thickness of the networking to promise new learning (Interview (B), 2014). This result 
was anticipated by Checkel proposing that ‘where a group met repeatedly, and where 
there was a high density of interactions among participants’ social learning was most 
likely to occur (p. 549).  
 
Second, the ability to persuade was not a minor factor contributing to enhanced social 
learning. The EEAS and ECHO personnel, those from OSCE and the EU co-chairs, were 
recognised as having sway over the attendants, during training, and their involvement in 
tuition and assistance in the practical exercises. Whether this result was due to their 
personal ability or to other reasons is hard to say. The interviewed ASEAN leaders close 
to the ARF organisation (Interview (D), 2013) and Southeast Asian security policy 
analysts (Interview (E), 2014) have, however, acknowledged that the persons involved in 
the Forum’s activities, in most cases, had an enhanced persuasive capability, which they 
accredited to the authority of their position. The persuasive ability provided guidance. 
Concerning the connection between persuasion and social learning, Checkel explained a 
dynamic: when the persuader was an authoritative member of the in-group to which the 
persuadee (e.g. representatives of ASEAN and its member states) belonged or wanted to 
belong, persuasion was most likely to materialise (p. 550).  
 
Third, also, there is the ‘crisis’ and ‘policy failure’ argument that gives weight to 
social learning. Since the Bangkok Declaration was agreed, in 1997, to give shape to the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN set the norm that its group was to remain in a higher 
ranked position compared to the other participants’, due to its role as founder of the 
Forum. An interviewed ASEAN leader (Interview (F), 2013) suggested that, when the 
cyclone hit and damaged the Irrawaddy delta, the ASEAN group was discouraged and 
sensed the emergency on its shoulders, felt an added responsibility, and the role of 
dealing with the crisis emerged as an obligation. The entire region was in a humanitarian 
and environmental depression, and all ASEAN nations were bound to suffer the 
consequences of this (Interview (F), 2013). No doubt, Myanmar’s junta’s foreign policy 
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was evidence of policy failure. Refusing the help of the external donors, whose ships 
have been left for weeks anchored in the Adaman Sea (Selth 2008), the lack of capability 
to provide assistance to its people was unquestionable. ‘Crisis’ and ‘policy failure’ were 
evident in the context within which the ASEAN’s relief operation took place.6 These 
reasons reconnect with Checkel’s account that social learning was more likely ‘where the 
group felt itself in a crisis or was faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy 
failure’ (p. 549).  
 
In the end, processes of social learning might have helped to take advantage of the 
notions assimilated at the groups’ meetings in the ARF framework. For instance, 
explaining the usefulness of intervening to reduce risks and crises, and suggesting that 
such support to the region, when required, was a highly valuable contribution to security 
and wellbeing, as advanced in Potsdam, in 2005, was a powerful message, by the EU, to 
inspire ASEAN.   
 
(iii) The logic of consequences and Myanmar   
 
The other new development that emerged in connection with Nargis’ devastation was 
Myanmar’s junta’s softened non-interference stance. To interpret that change, March and 
Olsen (1998) explained that the logic of expected consequences suggests that the strategic 
calculation of rational bargaining of a government’s protection and defence of what it 
perceives as its national interest confronts but frequently becomes reconciled with the 
position of other states on the same policy issue (p. 950). In the post-Nargis situation, the 
strategic calculation of rational bargaining by Myanmar’s junta challenged the position of 
the other actors, specifically ASEAN, and the ASEAN Secretariat which was willing to 
network with Myanmar’s government. The rational bargaining’s challenge was, firstly, 
manifested by the junta’s denial of external help, and protection of the political order that 
it held dear, and the defence of what it perceived to be the national interest (Selth 2008; 
Haacke 2008; Cook 2013).  
 
Only subsequently, a different logic (that March and Olsen explain as the logic of 
appropriateness (1998, 951-2; 2004)) emerged. It was manifested by late forces for 
change (Haacke 2008). An interviewed Myanmar historian  (Interview (G), 2014) 
believed that the ethical dimension of the responsibility to protect its own people was a 
true response which became more definite only successively. Also, the collective norms 
of the ASEAN group to reduce the risk to security (as established in the ARF’s Concept 
Paper of 1995) was another encouragement to change that was confirmed by an officer of 
the ASEAN Secretariat  (Interview (H), 2013). A further motive was proposed by a 
Singaporean security analyst (Interview (I), 2014) as the collective norm of avoiding 
impinging negatively on the strengthened regionalism in Southeast Asia that the ASEAN 
group was engaged in pursuing through its efforts. Another interpretation, by the same 
expert, hypothesised the pressure felt by the junta to comply with the Seven Steps 
programme (combined with the need to be more accommodating (Interview (I), 2014) 
vis-à-vis ASEAN’s offer of networking) as incentives to support the new logic, that 
March and Olsen indicate as a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998, 2004).  
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Social mechanisms and Myanmar?  
Yet, Checkel’s study (1999) suggests that social mechanisms may have been active 
among Myanmar’s representatives at the Forum and bore a relation to the resulting 
softened stance. Think of the case in which, while at the meetings and working groups, 
Myanmar’s officials stayed apart, discreetly seeking to maintain their government’s 
distinctiveness. Though, being present, they could hardly escape from the social 
mechanisms produced by the surroundings. As social learning involved a process 
whereby the actors (through interaction with broader institutional contexts, rules and 
discourses) acquired new interests and preferences (Checkel 1999, 548), Myanmar’s 
representatives, by sharing the on-going practices with the other participants, were part of 
the development processes. For them too, ‘where new tasks were communicated’ was at 
the workshops and joint sessions, which generated circumstances where ‘agents’ of new 
interests were easier to breed than on other occasions. The method of discoursing 
together and understanding the difficulties others needed to overcome carried weight on 
shaping the attitudes to one’s own country’s problems. Some discourses by others could 
have raised Burma’s representatives’ attention. Myanmar’s representatives might have 
‘internalised’ the normative messages of the discourses as a ‘reflex’ (Checkel 2005, 811). 
The messages might have had the potential of creating new confidence in Myanmar’s 
representatives (and then in the junta). A possible ‘confidence factor’ was, for example, 
the ‘persuasion’ that an operation of the type of the action undertaken by ASEAN (the 
UN and other actors) was to remain under the junta’s strict control, as well as to 
contribute towards reducing problems.
7
 This view and interpretation has not been 
dismissed by a Southeast Asian security policy analyst (Interview (E), 2014) when 
discussed together. The post-Nargis cooperation might have appeared as a foreign policy 
alternative that was not completely unacceptable to the non-interference option. Checkel 
suggests that ‘social learning involves a break with strict forms of methodological 
individualism’ (Checkel 1999, 548).  
 
Agent-carriers of new ideas?  
Also, Checkel’s social mechanisms would lead to seeing Burma’s representatives 
becoming agent-carriers of new ideas and identities (Checkel 1999, 549). Since the 
representatives were due to report to their administration’s generals about the 
communications and messages received (and ‘understood’) at meetings, groups and sub-
groups, they could become active in their nation’s capital. As (potential) agents for 
change, the representatives might have wanted to convince the junta’s administrators that 
some solutions (as they ‘understood’ them) were better than others. Also, they might 
have shown themselves to be ‘less persuaded’ about the goodness of the constant non-
interference profession. These suggestions could be matters for further research, 
investigated by means of local questioning and interviewing. The above processes, 






(iv) The logic of appropriateness and the EU  
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The other observed new development connected with Nargis was the inclusion of the 
‘shared responsibility to protect population’ as a new goal of the EU’s security policy of 
December 2008 (IESS 2008, 12). March and Olsen’s logic of appropriateness would 
suggest that  ‘rules’ associated with specific ‘identities’ and ‘circumstances’ (March and 
Olsen 1998, 951) challenged the EU. The prime circumstance was created by Myanmar 
and its people, deprived by the catastrophic Nargis. The other circumstance was provided 
by the EU and specifically by the Council re-thinking the EU’s performance, i.e. whether 
the EU, during the Nargis incident, has behaved in accordance with its identity and the 
rules to which it agreed (EUC 2008, 28). The EU had established the norm concerning 
the readiness ‘to share in the responsibility for global security’ in the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) that the Council ratified in 2003. In that document, the EU spelled out that 
the ‘concept of responsibility to protect needed to evolve in response to developments’ 
(ESS 2003, 1). Later, in 2005, the EU was at the forefront of the diplomacy that resulted 
in the UN General Assembly’s agreement with the notion of a ‘responsibility […] to help 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity’ (UNGA 2005; Marchi 2011, 157). Notwithstanding the norm that it had fixed 
in the ESS almost five years before the cyclone struck and the progress achieved at the 
UN, the EU was yet ‘normatively un-clear’ on whether ‘to assist in circumstances like 
that of Myanmar’s Nargis’ was a EU’s compulsion (EUC 2008, 28). March and Olsen’s 
appropriateness thinking reveals that ‘action involves evoking an identity or role[,] and 
matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation’ (p. 951). Both the 
sense of obligation ingrained in the EU’s identity, its normative actorness, valued and 
principled foreign policy (Manners 2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006) and the 
recommendation embedded in the ESS (of evolving the notion concerning ‘when’ the 
choice to protect became a recognised responsibility) have backed the EU and Council’s 
new claim, that cyclone-deprived Myanmar contributed towards encouraging. The claim 
upheld that a ‘Europe de la securite humaine’ was a sufficiently broad concept for the 
EU to adopt in order to embrace ‘natural disasters’ and ‘multiple sources of insecurity’, 
which were associated with Myanmar’s situation (EUC 2008, 39). The broadened 
concept was, now, suitable to answer the Council’s question of ‘whether or not the 
humanitarian assistance to the people affected by the cyclone, in Burma, was a reason for 
the responsibility to protect’ entering into action (EUC 2008, 28).   
 
VII Conclusion  
 
This empirical investigation has focused on the EU’s efforts, via ASEAN, at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, concerning Myanmar, seeking to encourage security cooperation during 
2004-2008. It has shown the interest the EU has attached to the Forum, the only platform 
for security dialogue in Southeast Asia, a region where the EU is not a major actor in 
security affairs. It placed emphasis on the 2014 and 2013 events that testified to the 
existence of a Myanmar-EU security connection that motivated the two key questions 
around which this work has developed. It investigated the above EU’s efforts, focusing 
on the EU as co-chair with ASEAN of ARF meetings. It explained that, since ARF 
activities were mostly concerned with crisis management and disaster relief capacity 
building, Cyclone Nargis, ravaging Myanmar, was used as a test case to draw 
considerations that served to answer this work’s two main questions. Concerning the first 
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question (how has the EU interacted with Myanmar via ASEAN, at the Forum, trying 
(directly or indirectly) to induce Myanmar’s junta towards connecting with cooperation 
in the area of security, as opposed to its preferred ‘non-interference policy’), the answer 
has been shown, by this investigation, by the EU publicising the multilateral aspects of its 
policy in the field of security on the basis of its experience and aspiration to encourage 
others to follow. March and Olsen, and also Checkel, have indicated the processes 
leading to the softened non-interference stance that Myanmar’s junta has demonstrated as 
holding, when it accepted the relief operation made possible by ASEAN to assist during 
Nargis. The processes had a direct link to the EU which wanted to mobilise the different 
strengths, values and capacities of its partners. The investigation has endeavoured to 
substantiate these processes by means of interviewing – ASEAN leaders and leaders 
close to the ARF organisation, Southeast Asian security analysts, Burmese historians, 
together with officials from the European Crisis Response and Operational Coordination 
and the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, and, more in general, from the EEAS. 
Concerning the second question (as the EU sought to convince Myanmar to compromise 
and accept cooperation, has Myanmar, hit by Cyclone Nargis, had some consequences 
for the EU and its security policy, and, if so, how?), the investigation availed itself of 
March and Olsen’s understanding of the logic of appropriateness, which led to a 
realisation of the extent to which Myanmar’s Nargis incident contributed towards moving 
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 For a detailed description of ARF’s activities, see the Concept Paper (ARF-CP 1995).   
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 In 2005, the EU shared the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) with ASEAN. The mission was designed to 
monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement signed by the Indonesian 
government and the Free Aceh Movement. The EU, together with contributing countries from ASEAN, as 
well as Norway and Switzerland, deployed the mission. For an account of AMM’s developments, see: 
Schulze (2007) and Tholens (2012).   
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 For OSCE’s attributes, see Galbreath and Brosing (2013, 275-78).  
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 For an account of ASEAN’s dealing with Cyclone Nargis, see: Haacke (2008, 370-73).  
5
 For a discussion of the factors complicating the responsibility to protect’s implementation in the Asia-
Pacific region, see Weber (2013b, 29-31).  
6
 A security policy analyst questioned in Singapore (Interview (E), 2014) believed that the intervention in 
Indonesia’s Aceh region, in collaboration with the EU, in 2005, was of support to ASEAN’s new initiative. 
The commentator purported that the Aceh Monitoring Mission served as a formative preparation. It 
facilitated the institution of the Humanitarian Task Force and the Tripartite Core Group, to organise the aid 
work which focused help entirely on Myanmar. 
7 A similar discourse was aired in Potsdam, when EU’s officials reported about ‘relief actions’ remaining 
under the control of the nation agreeing to cooperate. 
8
 Interviewed Southeast Asian security policy analyst suggested that the deflection from the non-
interference strategy showed up by the junta was more ‘associated to the specific circumstance’ of Nargis’ 
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